



The Private Value Single Item Bisection Auction
Citation for published version (APA):
Grigorieva, E., Herings, P. J. J., Müller, R. J., & Vermeulen, A. J. (2007). The Private Value Single Item
Bisection Auction. Economic Theory, 30, 107-118. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 02 Nov. 2021
Economic Theory (2007) 30: 107–118
DOI 10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z
RESEARCH ARTI CLE
Elena Grigorieva · P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Rudolf Müller · Dries Vermeulen
The private value single item
bisection auction
Received: 16 October 2004 / Accepted: 26 August 2005 / Published online: 11 November 2005
© Springer-Verlag 2005
Abstract In this paper we present a new iterative auction, the bisection auction,
that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. The bisection auction has
fewer rounds than the classical English auction and causes less information to be
revealed than the Vickrey auction. Still, it preserves all characteristics the English
auction shares with the Vickrey auction: there exists an equilibrium in weakly
dominant strategies in which everyone behaves truthfully, the object is allocated
in accordance with efficiency requirements to the buyer who has the highest val-
uation, and the price paid by the winner of the object equals the second-highest
valuation.
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1 Introduction
A central task of auction design has been to develop mechanisms that have an imple-
mentation in weakly-dominant strategies resulting in an efficient allocation. Due
to the Revelation Principle, the focus has mainly been on direct revelation mecha-
nisms (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). In the private value envi-
ronment the challenge is considered to be solved since the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
direct mechanism implements the efficient allocation and is incentive-compati-
ble (Clarke 1971; Groves 1973; Vickrey 1961). However, by construction, imple-
mentation of an equilibrium strategy in a direct mechanism requires elicitation of
complete and exact preference information. It has been recognized that the full
revelation of bidders’ preferences is not necessarily a desirable feature of a mecha-
nism (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn 1991; Rothkopf, Tisberg, and Kahn 1990).
Bidders might be reluctant to truthfully reveal their full private value if there will
be subsequent auctions or negotiations in which the information revealed can be
used against them.
Such considerations lead to an interest in auctions where bidders need not reveal
their information entirely but only partially. Recent research has begun to examine
limited revelation auctions - mechanisms that elicit bidders’ valuations only up to
some limited precision (Conen and Sandholm 2002; Gilpin and Sandholm 2003;
Nisan and Blumrosen 2002; Parkes 2004). In particular, the effect on allocative
efficiency of low valuation revelation is studied. For example, Nisan and Blum-
rosen Nisan and Blumrosen (2002) introduce auctions in the single-object setting
where each bidder has a small number of possible bids to choose from, which
allows bidders to retain much of their private valuation information. The authors
determine auctions of this kind where the loss of economic efficiency incurred
relative to unconstrained auctions is mild.
The question that arises is how to design an auction that elicits less information
about bidders’ valuations than the Vickrey limited information revelation is often
believed to be incompatible with these requirements. Nevertheless, the primary
contribution of this paper is to present and to analyze an alternative auction format,
called the bisection auction, that possesses these properties for the case of selling
a single indivisible object under private values.
Suppose a single indivisible object is auctioned. The buyers’ valuations are
assumed to be integer, randomly drawn from a bounded interval – by default of
the form [0, 2R) for some positive integer R. The bisection auction has R rounds.
The price sequence starts at the middle of the initial interval with a price equal to
2R−1. Bidders report their demand at the current price by sealed bids. A yes-bid
stands for the announcement to be willing to buy at the current price, a no-bid for
the contrary. As a function of these bids, the auctioneer announces the price of the
next round.
In case there are at least two players submitting a yes-bid, the price goes up
to the middle of the upper half interval, i.e. to the interval [2R−1, 2R). The players
that are allowed to participate actively in the next round are the ones that said yes.
In case there is at most one player saying yes, attention shifts to the lower half
interval, i.e. the interval [0, 2R−1) and the price goes down to the middle of this
interval. The active players in the next round are the ones that said no. In case
there is a single buyer that submitted a yes-bid, this buyer becomes the winner and
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gets the object. Nevertheless the auction doesn’t end, but continues. In this second
phase of the auction the transaction price – the highest price at which at least one
of the other bidders would say yes – is determined.
Iterating this procedure will eventually yield a winner and a price. If in no
round there was precisely one player that said yes then ties are broken by random
assignment to a player who is still active after R rounds. At no point during the
auction are the bidders informed that the object has been assigned to the winning
bidder, or indeed that any particular bidder has dropped out of the auction. The
price is uniquely determined because in each round the length of the current inter-
val goes down by one half. Since the initial interval is of length 2R , after R rounds
the resulting interval is of length 1. And since it is a half-open interval, it contains
exactly one integer. This integer is declared to be the price the winner of the auction
has to pay for the object.
A related auction format is mentioned in Fujishima et al. (1999) in the con-
text of designing iterative auctions with quick and predictable termination time. In
particular Fujishima et al. (1999) write: “In what we call “the binary price-search
auction”, the auctioneer queries all bidders whether they are willing to pay a given
price. If only one bidder answers yes, he gets the good at that price. If zero or more
than one answer yes, another query follows at a lower or higher price, in such a
way to converge at logarithmic speed to a price that exactly one bidder will be
willing to pay. Unfortunately, this and other “accelerated auctions” are difficult to
analyze with the tools of game theory.”
The binary price-search auction is very similar to the bisection auction.A subtle
difference is that the binary price-search auction stops as soon as the winner has
been found. In this paper we present a full game-theoretic analysis of the bisection
auction. We show that the bisection auction is strategically equivalent to the Vick-
rey auction (and hence also to the English auction). It implies that, truth-telling
is a weakly dominant strategy in the bisection auction and the equilibrium results
in an efficient allocation. While being strategically equivalent to the Vickrey and
English auctions the bisection auction outperforms them. It is preferred over the
English auction because of its speed and over the Vickrey auction because of its
low valuation revelation requirement.
2 The bisection auction
The following example illustrates how the bisection auction works.
Example Suppose there are four bidders,A, B, C, and D, with the following integer
private valuations from the interval [0, 16): 11, 7, 15, 9. To determine the winner
and the price in this setting the bisection auction takes four rounds and starts with
an ask price equal to 8. Suppose that each bidder chooses to respond truthfully and
follows a straightforward strategy under which he says yes if an ask price is less
or equal to his valuation and no otherwise. Bidders are not informed about other
bidders’ choices. The bisection auction proceeds as follows:
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Round Price Lower bound Upper bound Bidder A Bidder B Bidder Bidder
C D
1 8 0 16 Yes No Yes Yes
2 12 8 16 No No Yes No
3 10 8 12 Yes No Yes No
4 11 10 12 Yes No Yes No
Since three bidders submitted yes-bids in the first round, the price increases to
the middle of the current price and the current upper bound. So the ask price of
the second round is 12. These three bidders remain active while bidder B drops
out. We allow a drop-out to submit any bid, but consider any bid of a drop-out as
a no-bid. Since there is only one yes-bid in the second round we have a winner
and we enter what we call the price determination phase. From now on, any bid of
the winner, bidder C, is considered as a yes-bid. Players A and D are still active.
In the third round, there are two yes-bids so the price increases. Player D drops
out. In the fourth round, the auction terminates. Taking into account bids made
during the last round we compute the final lower and upper bounds. Since there
were two yes-bids the upper bound remains 12 while the lower bound becomes
11. The winner, bidder C, takes the object and pays price 11 which is the smallest
Walrasian price for the demand announced by the bidders that participated in this
auction.
2.1 Formal representation of the auction
Here we model the auction as a non-cooperative game in extensive form with
imperfect information.
The game
(1) A finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players that participate in the game.
(2) A number of rounds R that specifies the duration of the game.
(3) For each player a decision set A = {yes, no}. This reflects the fact that each
player has to make a binary decision in each and every of his information sets.
(4) Every node in the game tree is a vector a that represents the history of decisions
chosen by players before the game reached this node. Formally, a = (ak)rk=1
with 1 ≤ r ≤ R where ak = (aki)ni=1 for k < r and ar = (ari)ji=1 for some
j ≤ n. Here aki is the decision in A by player i in round k.
The length of a node is defined as l(a) = (r − 1)n + j . The initial node a0 is a
node with length equal to 0. The nodes with length equal to rn are referred to as
the start of round r + 1. The terminal nodes are nodes whose length is equal to Rn.
(5) There is an edge between two nodes a and b if the length of b is equal to the
length of a plus one, and for all i and k for which aki is defined, aki = bki .
Let Xr denote the set of nodes corresponding to round r. The set Xr partitions
into n sets Xri, each Xri being the set of nodes in round r where player i has to
make a decision. Formally, Xri = {a | l(a) = (r − 1)n + i − 1}. For a node
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a ∈ Xr and q < r, let aq = (ak)qk=1 denote the part of the history a corresponding
to the first q rounds. We associate with every node a ∈ Xr the set P(a) of players
whose decisions made in round r − 1 equal yes, taking into account that decisions
of drop-outs are counted as no, decisions of a winner as yes.
(6) Node a in Xri belongs to the information set H(a) defined as the set of all
nodes b from Xri such that for all k < r
1. aki = bki
2. |P(ak)| ≤ 1 iff |P(bk)| ≤ 1.
(7) We associate with each terminal node τ , a set WIN(τ ) that is a set of candidate
winner(s) of the game if the game terminates in node τ . If in one of the rounds
corresponding to node τ there has been exactly one yes-bid, then WIN(τ )
consists of the player that submitted this bid. Otherwise, WIN(τ ) equals the
set of players that never dropped out. In that case, the winner of the game is
determined by a lottery among all players i in WIN(τ ). The price the winner
pays is





where for all k
λk =
{−1 if |P(τ k)| ≤ 1
1 otherwise and β =
{−1 if |P(τ)| ≤ 1
0 otherwise.
The payoff of player i with private value vi in terminal node τ is defined by
Ui(τ ) =
{
vi − p(τ) with probability 1|WIN(τ)| if i ∈ WIN(τ)
0 else.
A few remarks. To describe the auction more precisely, we partition the set of play-
ers N into three subsets of players, A(a) – the set of players that are active in node
a, W(a) – the winner set in node a, and D(a) – the set of players that dropped out
before the game reached node a. For the initial node a0 they are defined as follows:
A(a0) = N , W(a0) = ∅ and D(a0) = ∅. We iteratively define them for nodes with





W(ar−1) if W(ar−1) = ∅
∅ if W(ar−1) = ∅ and |P(a)| = 1
P(a) if W(ar−1) = ∅ and |P(a)| = 1
D(a) =
{
D(ar−1) if |P(a)| ≤ 1
D(ar−1) ∪ {i ∈ A(ar−1) | ari = no} otherwise
A(a) = N \ (W(a) ∪ D(a)).
For a node a = (ak)rk=1 with l(a) = nr , we define these sets as follows: W(a) =
W(ar−1), D(a) = D(ar−1), and A(a) = A(ar−1).
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In a similar way as for terminal nodes, we can associate a price with an arbitrary
internal node. For a node a = (ak)rk=1 with l(a) = nr we define its price by





where for all k
λk =
{−1 if |P(ak)| ≤ 1
1 otherwise.
Note that for a with l(a) = nr the price p(a) = p(ar−1) + 2R−r−1 if |P(a)| > 1
and p(a) = p(ar−1)− 2R−r−1 if |P(a)| ≤ 1. Furthermore, for a node a = (ak)rk=1
with l(a) = nr we define p(a) = p(ar−1).
In any node a we now have a price. The actions a player can take in this node
a, either a yes or a no, can be interpreted as being his answer to the question:
Are you willing to pay the price p(a) for the object we are selling?
Moreover, these prices can be used to characterize information sets. For any
a, b ∈ Xri from the same information set, p(a) = p(b). Each information set in
Xri can be represented by its associated price and the sequence of decisions chosen
by player i in the first r − 1 rounds.
Observe that the way the auction proceeds depends only on the behavior of
active players. The following result shows that the bisection auction leads to a very
particular information structure.
Proposition 2.1 For an information set in which player i is active and for every
decision of player i made in this set, there exists exactly one immediate successor
information set H(a) in which player i is still active. Moreover, this immediate
successor is, in case the player chose yes, the one with |P(a)| > 1 and the one
with |P(a)| ≤ 1 in the other case.
This proposition is an immediate consequence of the definition of an informa-
tion set. Once a player said no from the fact that he stays active he can infer that
there was nobody or exactly one player with a yes-bid, but he can’t distinguish
between these two possible cases so that he can conclude whether the winner is
found already.
3 Playing the game
3.1 Equivalence of strategies and threshold strategies
Let Hi denote the collection of player i’s information sets.
Definition 3.1 A strategy for player i is a function si : Hi → A.
First notice that the number of information sets of each player corresponding to
round k is equal to 4k−1 (unless the number of players equals two, in which case it
is 3k−1). The total number of information sets in the game for each player is equal








R−1). We will show that the number of essentially different strategies
is much lower, in the order of 2R to be specific. We denote by p(H) the price
corresponding to information set H.
Definition 3.2 Let t be an integer, called the threshold. The threshold strategy
sti : Hi → A assigns the action yes to H ∈ Hi with p(H) ≤ t and the action no
to H ∈ Hi with p(H) > t .
We show next that from a strategic perspective players may restrict themselves to
using threshold strategies only. First we need the following result.
Lemma 3.3 Let si be a strategy of player i and let r be a round. Then there is a
unique information set Hr,i(si) of player i such that if he is still active in round
r he will necessarily be in information set Hr,i(si). Furthermore, the price of this
information set Hr,i(si) equals





where for all k
λk =
{−1 if si(Hk,i(si)) = no
1 if si(Hk,i(si)) = yes.
Lemma 3.3 follows easily as a consequence of Proposition 2.1. It enables us to
specify for any strategy its equivalent threshold strategy.
Definition 3.4 Let si be a strategy of player i. The threshold ti(si) is defined by
ti(si) = p(HR,i(si)) + β where β = −1 if si(HR,i(si)) = no and β = 0 if
si(HR,i(si)) = yes.




Theorem 3.5 Let si be a strategy and let s̃i be the threshold strategy with threshold
ti(si). Let s−i be an arbitrary collection of strategies for players other than i. Let
a be the realized history if s = (si, s−i ) is played and let b be the realized history
if s̃ = (s̃i , s−i ) is played. Then for both histories holds
1. For every round r , A(ar−1) = A(br−1), D(ar−1) = D(br−1) and W(ar−1) =
W(br−1).
2. For every round r where player i is active according to a we have ar = br .
3. For all k ≤ r and all players j = i, akj = bkj .
4. All players j = i in all rounds reach the same information sets.
5. The payoff of all players are the same in a and b.
Proof We will first prove statements 1, 2 and 3 by induction.
(A) For round r = 1. By definition, A(a0) = A(b0), D(a0) = D(b0) and W(a0) =
W(b0).
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In order to prove (2) and (3), notice that the set X1j is the only information set of
any player j in round 1. Obviously a1j = b1j for all j = i, so it remains to prove
that a1i = b1i or equivalently that si(X1i ) = s̃i (X1i ).
If si(X1i ) = no we have to show that ti(si) < p(X1i ). By Lemma 3.3 it holds
that λ1 = −1, so




R−k−1 + β ≤ p(X1i ) − 2R−2 +
R−1∑
k=2
2R−k−1 < p(X1i ).
Similarly, if si(X1i ) = yes we can show that ti(si) ≥ p(X1i ).
(B) Now suppose that (1)–(3) are true in round r . We will show that they are also
true for r + 1. Using (3) of the induction hypothesis it follows easily that
A(ar) = A(br), D(ar) = D(br) and W(ar) = W(br), which proves (1).
In order to prove (2) and (3), suppose that according to a player i is active in round
r +1. Then player i is also active in round r . We know from the induction hypothe-
sis that ar = br . It is then clear that ar+1,j = br+1,j for all players j = i. The only
thing left to show is ar+1,i = br+1,i or equivalently si(Hr+1,i (si)) = s̃i (Hr+1,i (si)).
If si(Hr+1,i (si)) = no, we have to show that ti(si) < p(Hr+1,i (si)). Lemma
3.3 implies λr+1 = −1. So,








2R−k−1 < p(Hr+1,i (si)).
The other case goes again along the same lines of reasoning.
(4) This follows easily from (2).
(5) Observe that the payoff is a function of the information sets reached in round R
and decisions of active players made in the last round. All these are the same.
	

Corollary 3.6 Any strategy si of a player i can be represented by an equivalent
threshold strategy s̃i .
In the following, we will restrict our attention to threshold strategies and denote
them just by referring to the threshold.
3.2 Playing the game with threshold strategies
In this subsection we show that the winner of the object to be sold is a player
with the maximum threshold and the price equals the second-highest threshold,
and consequently that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy.
Let t = (ti)i∈N be a profile of thresholds played in the bisection auction. This
profile remains fixed during the next few statements. We denote the terminal node
where the game ends according to this profile by τ ∗. Let p(r) = p((τ ∗)r−1) be the
price in round r for this realization of the game.
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Definition 3.7 The maximum threshold tmax is defined to be the number maxi∈Nti .
Definition 3.8 Let k be a player with tk = tmax. The second-highest threshold tsec
is defined to be the number maxi∈N/{k}ti .
Theorem 3.9 Let t = (ti)i∈N be a profile of thresholds played in the bisection
auction. The winner of the game is necessarily a player whose threshold equals
the maximum threshold.
Proof According to the definition the set of candidate winner(s) of the game is
WIN(τ ∗) = W(τ ∗) if W(τ ∗) = ∅ and WIN(τ ∗) = A(τ ∗) otherwise.
Case 1. W(τ ∗) = ∅.
Let W(τ ∗) = {k}. Consider the round r in which player k became the winner.
Then ark = yes and arj = no for all j = k. Thus tj < p(r) for all j = k and
tk ≥ p(r).
Case 2. W(τ ∗) = ∅.
Note that all players in A(τ ∗) must have chosen the same action in each round.
Therefore they have the same thresholds. A player j who became inactive in some
round r must have said no in this round while all players in A(τ ∗) said yes. But
then tj < p(r) ≤ tk for all k ∈ A(τ ∗) and for all j /∈ A(τ ∗). 	

Lemma 3.10 Let t = (ti)i∈N be a profile of thresholds played in the bisection
auction. A player with the second highest threshold remains active till the end of
the game.
Proof Let player j be a player with the second highest threshold. We have to show
that j ∈ A(τ r) for all 0 ≤ r ≤ R. The case r = 0 is trivial. Suppose the statement
is true for some r . We show that it is true for r + 1. There are three situations
concerning the winner set that could possibly occur.
(A) W(τ r+1) = ∅. It means that |P(τ r+1)| = 1. Suppose |P(τ r+1)| = 0. Then
A(τ r+1) = A(τ r) – all active players remained active, thus player j too. Sup-
pose |P(τ r+1)| > 1. Then every player with the highest threshold, as well
as any player with the second highest threshold, decides yes. In this case all
players from A(τ r) with a yes-bid remain active, including player j.
(B) W(τ r) = ∅ and W(τ r+1) = ∅. It means that |P(τ r+1)| = 1. The only yes-bid
comes from the, in this case unique, player with the highest threshold, and he
becomes the winner. The set of active players is A(τ r+1) = A(τ r) / W(τ r).
Thus player j remains active.
(C) W(τ r) = ∅. For this case it holds that |P(τ r+1)| ≥ 1. Suppose |P(τ r+1)| = 1.
Then all players from A(τ r) have made a no-bid and remain active, thus player
j too. If |P(τ r+1)| > 1, then at least one player from A(τ r) has made a yes-bid
and remains active. This surely includes player j because he has the highest
threshold among the players that are still active.
	

Lemma 3.11 Let t = (ti)i∈N be a profile of thresholds played in the bisection
auction. The price of the terminal node τ ∗ is equal to the threshold of any player
that is active at the end of the game.
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Proof Consider a player from A(τ ∗), say i. First of all we will show that |ti −
p(R)| ≤ 1. We prove this inductively by showing that |ti − p(r)| ≤ 2R−r for each
round r . For r = 1 the statement follows easily. Suppose it is true for some r .
(a) p(r) ≤ ti . Together with the assumption of the induction hypothesis it gives us
p(r) ≤ ti ≤ p(r) + 2R−r . Moreover, in this case player i has made a yes-bid
in round r. Since he is active in all rounds, the price went up to p(r) + 2R−r−1
in round r + 1, so |ti − p(r + 1)| ≤ 2R−r−1.
(b) p(r) > ti . For this situation we show in the same way that p(r)−2R−r ≤ ti ≤
p(r) and p(r+1) = p(r)−2R−r−1 from which it follows that |ti −p(r+1)| ≤
2R−r−1.
Thus, |ti − p(R)| ≤ 1 for any player who is active at the end of the game.
Case 1. p(τ ∗) = p(R) − 1 and so |P(τ ∗)| ≤ 1.
This last inequality implies that player i said no in the last round, so p(R) > ti .
Since |ti − p(R)| ≤ 1, p(τ ∗) = ti .
Case 2. p(τ ∗) = p(R) and so |P(τ ∗)| > 1.
This last inequality implies that player i said yes in the last round, in other words,
p(R) ≤ ti . If, he said yes in all rounds, p(R) = 2R − 1, and thus p(R) = ti .
Otherwise, if follows from the construction of the bisection auction that the last
round in which player i has said no has a price equal to p(R)+ 1. So p(R) ≤ ti <
p(R) + 1, and thus p(τ ∗) = ti . 	

Corollary 3.12 Let t = (ti)i∈N be a profile of thresholds played in the bisection
auction. The price the winner of the game pays is equal to the second highest
threshold.
Definition 3.13 The truth-telling strategy of player i is the threshold strategy for
which t is equal to player i’s valuation vi .
Theorem 3.14 The truth-telling strategy of player i is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof From the previous results, specifically Theorem 3.9 and Corollary 3.12,
it follows that we can interpret the thresholds from Corollary 3.6 as bids in the
Vickrey auction. The bisection auction is therefore strategically equivalent to the
Vickrey auction, and telling the truth is a weakly dominant strategy. 	

A final immediate consequence of this theorem is the following corollary.
Corollary 3.15 The truth-telling strategy profile constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. It is the unique perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Some remarks on generalizations of the bisection auction
The bisection auction assumes that the bidders’ valuations are randomly drawn
from a probability distribution on the bounded set [0, 2R)n. There is no problem to
extend the bisection auction to the case where the upper bound is equal to infinity.
The key insight is that the current construction where after each round the current
interval is split in two equally sized intervals can be generalized to any split without
changing our main results. In particular, one may start the first round with the inter-
val [0, ∞), which splits in the intervals [0, u) and [u, ∞) for some integer u. As
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long as all realizations of valuations are assumed to be finite, after a finite number
of rounds attention will be restricted to an interval with a finite upper bound.
The rules of the bisection auction presented in the sections above are con-
structed in such a way that the only information revealed to players after each
round is the change of the price. This information policy is less restrictive than it
may look at first sight. First of all, in order to make the formal representation of
the auction and the proofs of its properties concise and comprehensive we decided
not to include the number or identities of the drop-outs in the information revealed.
Notice however that revealing which players dropped out does not reveal whether
or when the winner has been determined. Thus, revealing which players drop out
does not change the weak dominance of truth-telling. Only the formal proof of this
property becomes more sophisticated. Information sets of a player are character-
ized then, in addition to price and own previous actions, by time and the identity
of the players that dropped out. So, the strategy space becomes larger and more
complicated. But we still can show that for any strategy from this extended space
there exists an outcome equivalent threshold strategy, so that our results of this
section hold for the auction with such an information policy.
The possibilities offered by for instance the internet render a practical imple-
mentation of the bisection auction feasible. Bidders should be informed about the
rules of the bisection auction, in particular about how prices respond to the number
of yes-bids, and about the fact that the price in each round is the only information
transmitted to them.
Now we will examine what happens if after each round the bids of all the play-
ers are revealed, so not only the drop-outs but also the winner becomes publicly
known. The following example shows that truth-telling is not a weakly dominant
strategy in the bisection auction under this information policy.
Example Consider the bisection auction under the full information policy with two
players. Let player A choose to act according to the following strategy: to say no up
to the moment the winner is found and yes afterwards. Regardless of his valuation
the best that player B can do against this strategy is to say no in all rounds but the
very last one. Player B will get the object for a price equal to zero. 	

Nevertheless, it can still be shown that the truth-telling profile constitutes an ex-
post Nash equilibrium. Indeed, let’s analyze what the best thing is player i can do
given that all other players follow the truth-telling strategy. If player i doesn’t win,
his payoff is zero. If he wins he pays the price equal to the highest valuation of other
players, so the price is not influenced by his behaviour during the auction. Thus,
any strategy that guarantees winning in case player i’s valuation is the highest is a
best response. One such strategy is the truth-telling strategy.
4 Conclusions
We proposed a new auction, the bisection auction, and analyzed its equilibrium
properties. First, we have proved that in the bisection auction, threshold strategies
are sufficient from a strategic point of view. Furthermore, we have shown strategic
equivalence of the bisection auction to the Vickrey auction. Using this result we
established that the proposed auction is incentive compatible, that is truth-telling is
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a weakly dominant strategy. Moreover, the equilibrium that results when everyone
tells the truth is efficient in the sense that the player with the highest valuation gets
the object.
Concerning the revelation of bidders valuation, participation in the bisection
auction is less demanding than in the Vickrey auction and usually less demanding
than in the English auction. In the Vickrey auction all players need to reveal their
valuation, and in the English auction all bidders except the bidder with the highest
valuation need to reveal their valuation. In the bisection auction only the bidder
with the second highest valuation has to do this, all other bidders only reveal their
valuation up to a precision required to determine the winner and the precise value
of the second highest valuation. Moreover, the procedure used in the bisection auc-
tion guarantees a fast and predictable termination, in contrast to the English auction
which is on average relatively slow if it uses unit increments and risks inefficient
allocations if it uses larger increments.
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